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Abstract
The general definition of mental disorder stated in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders seems to identify a mental disorder with 
a harmful dysfunction. However, the occurrence of distress or disability, which may 
be dubbed the harm requirement, is taken to be merely usual, and thus not neces-
sary: a mental disorder can be diagnosed as such even if there is no harm at all. In 
this paper, we focus on the harm requirement. First, we clarify what it means to say 
that the harm requirement is not necessary for the general concept of mental disor-
der. In this respect, we briefly examine the two components of harm, distress and 
disability, and then trace a distinction between mental disorder tokens and mental 
disorder types. Second, we argue that the decision not  to regard the harm require-
ment as a necessary criterion for the general notion of mental disorder is  tenable 
for  a number  of practical and theoretical reasons, some  pertaining to conceptual 
issues surrounding the two components of harm and others involving the problem of 
false negatives and the status of psychiatry vis-à-vis somatic medicine. However, we 
believe that the harm requirement can be (provisionally) maintained among the spe-
cific diagnostic criteria of  certain individual mental disorders. More precisely, we 
argue that insofar as the harm requirement is needed among the specific diagnostic 
criteria of certain individual mental disorders, it should be unpacked and clarified.
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Introduction
The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-5) seems to identify a mental disorder with a harmful dysfunction:1
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant dis-
turbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behaviour that 
reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental pro-
cesses underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated 
with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important 
activities. [2, p. 20] (emphasis added)
Two requirements are established, but they are clearly  ascribed different impor-
tance. First, the definition indicates that a mental disorder “reflects” a dysfunction. 
This means that dysfunction, which may be understood as  a proximal or underly-
ing pathological cause, is taken to be a necessary requirement for qualification as 
a mental disorder: no mental disorder can be correctly recognised as such without 
a dysfunction underlying it. Second, the definition goes on to say that a mental dis-
order is “usually associated with” significant distress or disability. This means that 
the occurrence of distress or disability, which may be dubbed the harm requirement, 
is taken to be merely usual,2 and thus not necessary: a mental disorder—either as a 
specific occurrence or as a type of condition—can be correctly recognised as such 
even if there is no harm at all.
In the present paper, we bracket the problems raised by the dysfunction require-
ment3 (which we directly address in [4]) and focus on the harm requirement alone. 
It should be noted that we do not aim to defend any particular definition of men-
tal disorder, either value-free or value-laden; we simply argue that the definition, 
whatever it is, should not contain the harm requirement. Moreover, we consider the 
general notion of mental disorder to be a theoretical one—in Christopher Boorse’s 
sense [5–7]—geared towards discriminating (metaphysically) between normal and 
pathological mental conditions  in psychiatry, just  as the notion of disease is typi-
cally geared towards discriminating between normal and pathological physical con-
ditions in somatic medicine.
To begin, in the next section, we attempt to clarify what it means to say that the 
harm requirement is not necessary for the general concept of mental disorder. First, 
we briefly examine the two components of the harm requirement—namely, distress 
and disability. We then trace a distinction between mental disorder tokens and men-
tal disorder types. If one focuses on mental disorder tokens, denying the necessity of 
the harm requirement would amount to saying that certain specific occurrences of 
a given mental disorder might be not harmful. On the other hand, if one focuses on 
1 Jerome Wakefield originally introduced the definition of mental disorder as a harmful dysfunction [1].
2 For the purpose of this paper, it is not important to specify the exact meaning of ‘usual’, but it is suf-
ficient to assume that it implies that the harm requirement is not necessary for mental disorder [3].
3 As the problems related to the dysfunction requirement are not the focus of this paper, we simply fol-
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mental disorder types, denying the necessity of the harm requirement would amount 
to saying that at least certain kinds of conditions count as mental disorders even 
though they are not harmful at all.
In the third section, we argue that the decision not to regard the harm requirement 
as a necessary criterion for mental disorder is tenable for a number of theoretical and 
practical reasons. Some of those reasons pertain to conceptual issues  surrounding 
the components of harm (i.e.,  distress and disability). Others include the problem 
of false negatives and the status of psychiatry vis-à-vis somatic medicine. Our main 
point here is that the harm requirement is unfit to serve as the definiens of medical 
disorder and thus should not be included within the DSM-5 general definition. How-
ever, we believe that the harm requirement can be (provisionally) maintained among 
the specific diagnostic criteria of certain individual mental disorders.
More precisely, in the fourth section, we argue that insofar as the harm require-
ment is (provisionally) needed among the specific  diagnostic criteria of  certain 
individual mental disorders, it should be unpacked to clarify (i) what its role is as 
a diagnostic criterion and (ii) with respect to whom, by whom, and how distress 
and disability should actually be judged and evaluated. Our aim here is to show that 
the harm requirement can be used and interpreted in many different and contrast-
ing ways, making its current wording ambiguous and problematic. A general claim 
stating that ‘the disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning’ is still too imprecise.
The harm requirement
Departing from previous editions of the manual, DSM-5 downgraded the harm 
requirement from a necessary constituent to a frequent or typical  characteristic of 
mental disorders—that is, from a prescription of what should be  regarded among 
mental disorders to a description of what mental disorders usually look like: ‘Men-
tal disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability  in social, 
occupational, or other important activities’ [2, p. 20] (emphasis  added).  By con-
trast, harm was presented as a necessary requirement in the definition of mental dis-
order given in the  third revised edition  (DSM-III-R) [8] and then  reiterated in the 
fourth edition (DSM-IV) [9] and its text revision (DSM-IV-TR) [10]: ‘Each of the 
mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral or psycho-
logical syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with 
present distress … or disability … or with a significantly increased risk of suffering’ 
[9, pp. xxi–xxii] (emphasis added).4
We acknowledge that the harm requirement of course  served an important his-
torical role, as it enabled the exclusion of homosexuality from the range of mental 
disorders [12]. In 1973, the nomenclature committee of the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) ‘reviewed the characteristics of the various mental disorders and 
4 The conceptual history of the upgrading and downgrading of the harm requirement is well illustrated 
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concluded that, with the exception of homosexuality and perhaps some of the other 
“sexual deviations,” they all regularly caused subjective distress or were associated 
with generalized impairment in social effectiveness of functioning’ [13, p. 211]; and 
on the basis of this, members of the APA voted for the removal of homosexuality 
per se from the manual with a referendum in 1974. Homosexuality per se was then 
replaced with sexual orientation disturbance [14] and ego-dystonic homosexuality 
[15], so as to diagnose those individuals who were homosexual and harmed by their 
condition, and then later removed entirely [8]. To be clear, the harmful dysfunction 
account of mental disorder does successfully explain why homosexuality has been 
eliminated from DSM [16].
Nevertheless, we also believe that the harm requirement is now no  longer nec-
essary in order to exclude homosexuality from psychiatric diagnoses, as the other 
criterion for qualification as a mental disorder—the dysfunction requirement—can 
provide sufficient reason for such exclusion  in  its own right. Current theories of 
homosexuality largely agree that it is a case of normal variation, with no dysfunc-
tion in play [17].
That being said, Jerome Wakefield has recently argued that no one ‘knows today 
what causes exclusive homosexuality … so one can’t really argue the dysfunction 
question on evidential grounds’ [18, p. 317]; for this reason, the harmful dysfunc-
tion account of mental disorder,  including the value-laden component of the harm 
requirement, is still better suited than value-free definitions—such as those using the 
biostatistical theory [5–7]—to explain the elimination of homosexuality from DSM 
[16].
On this point, it is important to repeat that we are not supporting any explicit 
definition of mental disorder; in particular, we are not defending a completely value-
free account of mental disorder, as our argument holds when either dysfunction or 
harm is a naturalistic or evaluative concept. Our main concern here consists in the 
technical features of the concept of harm, not in whether it is value-laden (as Wake-
field believes) or not, and our thesis is that the harm requirement is unfit to be con-
sidered a necessary condition for the general concept of mental disorder. Indeed, 
other concepts—such as risk factors—could play an evaluative role in determining 
whether or not a condition is a mental disorder, irrespective of whether it is harmful. 
This possibility, which is perfectly compatible with our argument against the harm 
requirement, would also exclude homosexuality from the battery  of  mental disor-
ders, even if homosexuality should in fact count as a dysfunction according to some 
definitions of function.
Returning now to the features of the harm requirement, the DSM definitions con-
strue harm as having two main components: distress and disability.
Distress is defined neither in DSM-5 nor in the most recent revision of the Inter-
national Classification of Diseases (ICD-11). However, there are many definitions 
implicitly employed or more explicitly stated in the scientific literature, ranging from 
a state of worry, anxiety, and preoccupation to a condition with quasi-depressive 
symptoms [19]. All of these characterisations are underspecific and vague and, as 
such, can easily be interpreted in many different ways.
The other conceptual component of the harm requirement is disability. The 
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disability as interference with activities of the whole person in relation to the 
immediate environment [20, 21]. In the same vein, the ICD-11, International Clas-
sification of Functioning, Disability and Health, and World Health Organization 
more broadly approach disability as a consequence of diseases, not as a part of their 
definition [22, 23] (see also [24, 25]). The DSM-5 endorses this line of thought and, 
in fact, contains an explicit claim that the concept of mental disorder and the concept 
of disability should not be  conflated with one another: ‘There have been substan-
tial efforts by the DSM-5 Task Force and the World Health Organization (WHO) to 
separate the concepts of mental disorder and disability (impairment in social, occu-
pational, or other important areas of functioning)’ [2, p. 21]. Disability is generally 
considered to be an intrinsically relational concept, which involves an environmen-
tal and social component. A person with a certain pathological condition (mental 
or somatic) can be either disabled or nondisabled by such condition, depending on 
where she lives, what she does for work, and how she acts more generally. This is 
the idea behind the social model of disability, which is dominant in non-psychiatric 
medicine [26]. For the purpose of this paper, we will assume this model.
In the next section, we argue in favour of the claim that neither distress nor dis-
ability should be part of the general definition of mental disorder. Our discussion 
should be read as a justification of what has already been done, or a defence of the 
move to downgrade the harm requirement against objections levelled by authors 
such as Cooper [3] and Wakefield [1, 16, 27], among others.5 First, however, we 
specify what  this downgrade amounts to  in view of the metaphysical distinction 
between tokens and types of mental disorders.
Generally speaking, a mental disorder type is an idealisation of what happens to 
a potentially infinite range of diverse patients; it is the exemplar or model that medi-
cal researchers study and that the clinician identifies as the kind of condition that a 
person has when she makes a diagnosis. A mental disorder token is the exemplifica-
tion or instantiation of a mental disorder type in a specific individual [28, 29].
If one focuses on mental disorder tokens, arguing against the necessity of the 
harm requirement would amount to saying that some occurrences of a given mental 
disorder type—that is, some instances of a certain kind of a mental disorder (e.g., 
erectile dysfunction, schizophrenia, alcohol abuse disorder)—might be harmless. In 
this respect, some occurrences of a mental disorder type could be correctly recog-
nised as such even if some individuals affected with it experience no harm at all. To 
put it differently, a specific individual may find a certain well-recognized pathologi-
cal condition, considered in and of itself, totally harmless, in the sense of being nei-
ther distressing nor disabling, but still be considered mentally disordered. For exam-
ple, consider a condition like erectile disorder with respect to an asexual person or 
a religious person who has  made a chastity vow; or, following Cooper’s example 
[30], consider a condition like schizophrenia with respect to someone who positively 
values her hallucinations (for more examples of this kind, see, e.g., [31]). Similar 
reflections can be offered even if harm is evaluated in relation to people other than 
5 Of course, it would be important to address what is wrong with each of these objections in greater 
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the patient herself (as we discuss later): many people diagnosed with a certain type 
of mental disorder do not cause any harm to their family or society.
If one focuses on mental disorder types, arguing against the necessity of the harm 
requirement would amount to saying that at least certain kinds of conditions can 
count as mental disorders—that is, can belong to the general mental disorder cat-
egory—even though they are not harmful at all. Put differently, mental disorders—
regarded as exemplars or models that medical researchers study and that clinicians 
identify as the kind of condition that an individual is affected by—do not need to 
meet the harm requirement to be recognised as such. In this respect, certain types of 
conditions could be correctly recognised as pathological (i.e., as mental disorders) 
even in the absence of any distress or disability—that is, even if they are intrinsi-
cally harmless, with respect to the patient, her family, or society. In general, think of 
lanthanic diseases or trivial diseases, such as minor rashes, skin lesions, or moles; 
and, more to our point, about petty mental disorders, such as minor tics—a tic being 
‘a sudden, rapid, recurrent, nonrhythmic motor movement or vocalization’ [2, p. 
81]. The argument that the harm requirement is not necessary for qualification as a 
mental disorder type is contentious, and indeed continues to divide philosophers of 
medicine today, but this claim is in line with the DSM-5 nosology. In fact, focusing 
on tic disorders, it becomes clear that the harm requirement is not needed, as it is 
explicitly claimed that ‘many individuals with mild to moderate tic severity experi-
ence no distress or impairment in functioning and may even be unaware of their tics’ 
[2, p. 84].
Against the harm requirement
In this section, we present and defend the main reasons—both practical and theoreti-
cal—for not including the harm requirement within the general definition of mental 
disorder. We also try to rebut some of the arguments that have been advanced  in 
favour of retaining the harm requirement within this definition. We begin by 
addressing reasons for discarding the harm requirement that have to do with the two 
components of harm—namely, distress and disability.
As noted above, ‘distress’ is never defined in DSM-5, standing for a range of 
concepts from desperation to mild anxiety. This underspecificity and vagueness  in 
the concept of distress  is already reason in and of  itself for not including distress 
in a general definition of mental disorder. Suppose we face a discrimination prob-
lem—that is,  a problem of  determining whether a certain condition is a mental 
disorder that should be added to the nosology or not. The verdict would be very 
different depending on how distress is intended to be understood. As such, a defini-
tion that includes distress among its components would not be helpful in the resolu-
tion of this discrimination problem.6 Of course, the above difficulties related to the 
6 Even if it is true that there is no distress where a condition causes no negative feelings, it can still be 
possible  for that condition  to be a mental disorder; cases of severe lack of insight in psychopathy or 
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notion of distress are not by themselves sufficient to conclude that the harm require-
ment should be eliminated from the general definition of mental disorder. In fact, 
the harm requirement could be differently articulated to avoid including the distress 
component; or the distress component could be better spelled out to mitigate its cur-
rent underspecificity and vagueness. That being said, as it stands, the notion of dis-
tress is presently unfit to figure into the general definition of mental disorder.
Another problem with this component is that distress (e.g., having symptoms of 
anxiety or depression) is often a totally normal part of our proper reactions to stress-
ful and negative life events. This makes it very difficult to know how to draw the line 
between normal distress and pathological distress. Should a condition of deep and 
prolonged distress after the death of a loved one be classified as a depressive dis-
order? Different normativists have tried to discriminate between normal and patho-
logical distress by appealing to the presence of a dysfunction [32] or an underlying 
objective cause [33], thus dismissing distress as a sufficient criterion for mental dis-
order. Nevertheless, ongoing discussions on this issue prove again that the concept 
of distress, given its ineliminable vagueness, is unfit to serve as the definiens of the 
general notion of mental disorder [19, 34, 35].
A further reason for not including the harm requirement in the general definition 
of mental disorder is that it  can easily lead to false negatives. False negatives are 
cases in which someone’s condition has been wrongly classified as a nondisorder, 
where it is in fact a mental disorder, and the mistake is due not to the clinician or 
researcher’s misapplication or ignorance of the criteria, but rather to the inadequacy 
of the criteria themselves [36, p. 1857].
Some of these false negatives may come as a consequence of the distress com-
ponent of harm. While distress may be relevant to the phenomenology of depres-
sive and anxiety disorders, there is no significant distress experienced by individuals 
diagnosed with conditions such as narcissistic personality disorder and, to a certain 
extent, histrionic personality disorder [37].7,8 A recent review of studies on hoarding 
disorder [38]—the acquisition and inability to let go of a large number of posses-
sions, resulting in clutter that precludes the use of one’s own living spaces—shows 
that patients’ subjective evaluation of their distress (and quality of life) is not in line 
with more objective measures of social and occupational functioning, intuitively 
because  such patients do not have sufficient insight into their situation. Again, if 
distress were endorsed as a general criterion within the definition of mental disorder, 
these conditions could not be classified as mental disorders (provided that disability 
is absent as well).
Other false negatives are connected with the disability component. While disor-
ders such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorders, and major depressive disorder may 
often be disabling conditions, others—such as alcohol  or substance use disorders 
7 Whose distress is relevant, and who should evaluate it? In the next section, we argue that some of the 
criteria for specific disorders involving harm are ambiguous with respect to such questions.
8 The distress experienced can have different sources, as people can be distressed either by their person-
alities as such or by the reactions that others have to their personalities. Both kinds of distress, however, 
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without severe symptoms, certain paraphilic disorders, and tic disorders—are com-
patible with having and maintaining a job, significant sentimental relations, and 
social roles. Alcohol abusers, for instance, may be temporarily high-functioning but 
also severely addicted, at least for a time [39]. The same point can be made about 
people showing early signs of mental disorders such as schizophrenia or neurocog-
nitive disorders whose symptoms are clear enough but still sparse [40], or about 
people diagnosed with similar disorders whose symptoms manifest in a way that 
is compatible with high-functioning. These kinds of conditions—regarded either as 
tokens or as types—do not always make people significantly less able or proficient 
in basic life skills. As such, if disability were  endorsed as a general requirement, 
many people would not be given a diagnosis of mental disorder, and thus would not 
be granted the consequent entitlement to treatment (again, provided that distress is 
absent as well).
In sum, even if mental disorders usually cause distress or disability, it is possi-
ble to have one without the other, thus making the harm requirement unnecessary 
for mental disorders  to qualify as such (when regarded as either  tokens or types). 
Some scholars, however, give an opposite reading of the above examples, conceiv-
ing them as false positives, rather than false negatives. Let us consider this point of 
view before illustrating the other reasons against adopting the harm requirement.
Cooper [3, 30], for instance, has recently argued that it would be  better to 
retain  the harm requirement within the definition of the general concept of men-
tal disorder because a person whose mental (or physical) dysfunction causes her no 
harm—‘a particular “symptomatic” but flourishing individual’ [3, p. 91]—should 
not be classified as having a mental disorder (or a disease). Her general point is that 
in all the above examples, the best thing to say  is that, evaluated in and of itself, 
‘the same condition can be pathological for one person but not for another. The 
schizophrenic for whom it is a good thing to be schizophrenic is not diseased, while 
another for whom it is a bad thing is’ [30, p. 274]. Indeed, there are entire move-
ments of individuals—such as the Mad Pride and neurodiversity movements—who 
do not feel harmed by their diagnoses of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or autism 
spectrum disorder [41]; many of them would also dovetail Cooper in thinking  of 
themselves as merely diverse, not mentally disordered.
We agree with Cooper, and the Mad Pride and neurodiversity movements, that 
a particular individual might find conditions like erectile disorder or schizophre-
nia totally harmless in and of themselves, being neither distressing nor disabling 
from that individual’s personal perspective. However, we do not support the con-
clusion that these conditions are not bona fide mental disorders—finding this to 
be extremely counterintuitive, especially as one moves from mental disorders to 
somatic diseases. Think about conditions like sterility with respect to someone 
who does not want to have babies; rolandic epilepsy with respect to someone who 
values her unpredictable seizures; or even infectious diseases, such as tuberculo-
sis, with respect to someone who finds her condition existentially advantageous 
and somehow desirable. This, in fact, is one of the readings of Hans Castorp in 
Thomas Mann’s novel The Magic Mountain, set in a sanatorium for tuberculo-
sis—arguably, Castorp felt good about the idea of having this condition [42]. 
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himself was not diseased, because he was fine with it? Given the burden of mor-
tality that this infectious disease has caused in the past, and still causes today, and 
current knowledge about its causes and effects on the human body, this would not 
be an acceptable conclusion. Therefore, it is not better to say—pace Cooper—that 
the same condition, evaluated in and of itself, can be a disease for one individual 
but not for another; on the contrary, it is better to say that the same disease, eval-
uated in and of itself, can be harmful for one individual but not for another. The 
same goes, mutatis mutandis, for mental disorders: it is better to say that the same 
mental disorder, evaluated in and of itself, can be harmful for one individual but 
not for another. Hence the conceptual connection between mental disorder and 
harmfulness can be erased: it is possible to have bona fide mental disorders that 
one is still happy and proud to accept and identify with. Then, it can simply be 
acknowledged that all of  the above cases exemplify instances of a well-recog-
nized pathological condition—either a somatic disease or a mental disorder—that 
is harmless for some  particular individuals. To recap, we believe that as far as 
mental disorder tokens are concerned, Cooper’s objection is not compelling.
Similar reflections can also be applied to mental disorder types. Imagine that 
all people affected by tuberculosis feel the same as Castorp. Should one conclude 
that tuberculosis is not a disease just because people affected by it experience 
no distress or disability? Given current knowledge about its causes and effects 
on the human body, we find such a possibility extremely implausible. Similarly, 
should  one conclude that syndactyly of the foot (webbed toes) is not a disease 
just because people affected by it experience little distress or disability? Again, 
we think that this would hardly be acceptable. So, from the bare fact that people 
diagnosed with conditions such as tic disorders experience no distress or disabil-
ity, it should not be concluded that these conditions are not mental disorders.
Let us return to other conceptual reasons for excluding the harm require-
ment. One further involves disability. The main conceptual point about disability 
is that it is a relational, context-dependent condition, as it varies considerably 
with the environment a person lives in—this is the social model of disability that 
we briefly introduce above [43–45]. According to this model, a child with blind-
ness, for example, can be either very disabled or minimally disabled depending 
on whether she lives in a familiar and instructive environment where appropri-
ate learning tools and facilities are provided (in principle, given the right envi-
ronment, she could even not be  disabled  at all). Analogously, a  learning disor-
der such as dyslexia can be a highly disabling condition for children living in 
an environment where there are no resources providing her with suitable  edu-
cational tools, while it might be a nondisabling condition for children who are 
adequately helped. Factors such as socioeconomic status, family links, occupa-
tion, and even artistic giftedness affect the degree of disability one experiences 
[46]. One of the advantages of this model is that it makes it possible to focus on 
what society can do for people with pathological conditions. Distinguishing dis-
ability from the mental disorder itself helps in identifying cases where proper 
environmental changes and provision of social resources, and not, say, individual 
therapy or medications, would make a difference to patients’ conditions [44, p. 
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itself obfuscates the reality that, like blindness, a condition like dyslexia reflects a 
dysfunction, irrespective of one’s living environment.
Moreover, distinguishing between being disordered and being disabled not only 
increases conceptual clarity, but also brings with it several types of practical, politi-
cal, and ethical advantages. One practical reason for downgrading the harm require-
ment has to do with the status of psychiatry as a science. Including distress and 
disability as criteria for mental disorder would, in effect,  serve to  further distance 
psychiatry from the rest of medicine. The notion  that the concept of disease must 
reflect its current use in somatic medicine and—more to our point—the idea  that 
psychiatry should aim at becoming closer and more like the other specialties of 
medicine are both certainly contentious and contested, but they are also claims that 
can be backed with good reasons, having to do with theory [5, 28, 47], research [48], 
and health care issues [43]. In somatic medicine, harm—and, more specifically, dis-
tress and disability—is not considered necessary for a condition to qualify as a dis-
ease: lanthanic diseases, trivial diseases such as minor rashes, skin lesions, or moles, 
and very early-stage cancers are clear examples to this effect. Consider asympto-
matic early-stage cancers, which cause neither distress nor disability—given the 
benefits of early diagnosis in terms of prognosis, imposing a harm condition would 
amount to preventing the possibility of treating and saving many patients. Similar 
considerations can easily be extended to mental disorders as well.
There is at least one political advantage to endorsing the conceptual link between 
mental disorder and disability. When disability was added to public health measures, 
which were previously focused only on mortality, mental disorders were eventually 
put on public health priority lists, and psychiatry received more attention [43, p. 82]. 
Here, however, we are not questioning the importance of knowing and communicat-
ing that mental disorders are significant causes of disabling conditions. What we are 
denying is a more specific and genuinely philosophical claim—namely, that harm 
should be a criterion for being a mental disorder, and for having one.
Of course, reflecting on the amount of harm a disease might bring about is impor-
tant, as such considerations can impact on judgments about whether a disease should 
actually be diagnosed in practice or whether an aggressive or excessively expensive 
treatment  is  appropriate [49]; however, similar considerations  should not impact 
on judgments—from a theoretical and metaphysical point of view—about whether 
or not a certain condition is a disease. The same reasoning can be applied to men-
tal disorders: considerations about the amount of harm a mental disorder can bring 
about may influence decisions about its clinical diagnosis and treatment, but they 
should not impact on theoretical and metaphysical judgments about whether or not 
it is a mental disorder in the first place. More generally, distress and disability can 
be useful for distinguishing between clinical/therapeutic normality and anormality, 
not for distinguishing between health and disease or mental disorder, which is what 
is at issue here (see Boorse [7, p. 13] for further elaboration on this distinction).
A general objection could be raised here: while it is true that some mental dis-
orders do not present current harm, they still have the potential to cause harm—as 
also stated in the DSM-III-R, DSM-IV, and DSM-IV-TR definitions of mental dis-
order [9, pp. xxi–xxii]. We think this objection is flawed for two reasons. First, the 
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possible initial stages of other conditions which clearly have a negative impact on 
the life expectancy or quality of life of a person. In fact, the notion of risk factors, 
not potential harm, is used in other areas of medicine; this concept comes from epi-
demiology and has nothing to do with distress or disability. Second, the notion of 
potential harm inherits all the problems associated with the two components of harm 
(distress and disability) discussed above, as well as ambiguities in the very notion of 
harm—whose harm is relevant, and who should evaluate it?—which we discuss in 
the next section.
The harm requirement as a diagnostic criterion
In the previous section, we defended the choice of the DSM-5 Task Force to down-
grade the harm requirement from a necessary criterion within the general definition 
of mental disorder to a ‘usually associated’ characteristic of mental disorders  that 
is not conceptually linked to them. In this section, we argue that listing the harm 
requirement among the specific diagnostic criteria for certain individual mental dis-
orders is not only compatible with this choice but also potentially useful for various 
reasons, which we discuss below. However, it is necessary to disambiguate the con-
cept of harm, as different uses and conceptions of harm may give rise to contradic-
tory diagnostic judgments. At least two questions are worthy of consideration: (i) 
What is the role of the harm requirement as a diagnostic criterion? And (ii) with 
respect to whom, by whom, and how should distress and disability be judged and 
evaluated?
Let us start by assessing the different primary roles of the harm requirement as a 
diagnostic criterion. Why is it needed among the specific diagnostic criteria for cer-
tain individual mental disorders? (Of course, the following list is merely descrip-
tive; that is, we surveyed the different roles that the harm requirement does play—or 
seems to play—in DSM-5.)
First, harm can help to mediate the current lack of relevant biological markers 
and clinically useful measurements of severity [2, p. 21; 45], thus helping to distin-
guish mental disorder from nondisorder and differentiate between mental disorder 
types. For instance, even if disability can be measured using the Disability Assess-
ment Schedule (WHODAS 2.0) [50], it is worth noting that the concept of severity 
of disease, and not that of disability, is actually employed in somatic medicine in 
order to set thresholds for clinical significance. Severity is operationalized in terms 
of aetiology and/or symptoms, without considering specific activities that one may 
come to find difficult to perform. For example, the degree of severity for hyperten-
sion (mild, moderate, or severe) depends on blood pressure level; the severity of a 
tumour correlates with its stage of development and diffusion; and the severity of 
diabetes mellitus is measured by blood tests as well as degrees of complication. In 
general, disability is not compatible with severity measures, given that it is highly 
relational in nature [39; 43, p. 84]. That being said, severity can hardly be assessed 
for many mental disorders, at least given the current  state of knowledge, and dis-
ability could thus provisionally fill this role. Consider anxiety disorders such as 
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dysfunction, it is still unclear how one might assess the severity of such disorders 
and establish the right thresholds for demarcating normal and pathological anxie-
ties. Put differently, when normality and pathology are on a continuum, and no bio-
logical markers or clinically useful measures of severity  have been identified, the 
harm requirement—that is, the presence of distress or disability—can (provision-
ally) be used to distinguish between dysfunction and nondysfunction, between dis-
order and nondisorder. Similarly, focusing on the difference between mild and major 
neurocognitive disorders, the harm requirement seems to be used to recognize dif-
ferent grades of dysfunctionality, and thus to discriminate between types of mental 
disorders.
In other cases, the presence of a dysfunction might be more dubious, as with rest-
less legs syndrome [2, p. 410], gambling disorder [2, p. 585],  or some paraphilic 
disorders [2, p. 685]. Here the harm requirement can (provisionally) be used to sup-
plement  the current lack of knowledge about underlying dysfunctions, and thus to 
separate normal from pathological conditions. Of course, should it be found that in 
similar cases no dysfunction is actually in play, the condition under analysis would 
be expunged from the DSM-5 nosology, even if it remains harmful, as the dysfunc-
tion requirement is taken to be necessary for mental disorders. This move, of course, 
would not exclude the possibility of continuing to treat such a condition, as clearly 
stated in the introduction  to DSM-5: ‘The diagnosis of a mental disorder is not 
equivalent to a need for treatment’; in particular, ‘the fact that some individuals do 
not show all symptoms indicative of a diagnosis should not be used to justify limit-
ing their access to appropriate care’ [2, p. 20].
Finally, there are conditions where the presence of a dysfunction is quite clear, 
and thus the label of mental disorder should be applied following the general DSM-
5 definition. However, there might be good reason not to diagnose or treat some of 
these conditions in practice. Consider erectile disorder [2, p. 426] or female orgas-
mic disorder [2, p. 429]: even if a dysfunction is surely present, there might be no 
need to diagnose or treat these conditions as mental disorders in practice unless they 
cause clinically significant distress to or disability for the individual. In such cases, 
however, the harm criterion is used not to discriminate between normal and patho-
logical conditions from a metaphysical point of view—that is, between mental dis-
orders and nondisorders—but rather  to discriminate between mental disorders that 
must actually  be diagnosed or medically treated in  practice and mental disorders 
that need not be. In this sense, as we mentioned at the end of the prior section, the 
concept of harm can be extremely useful for discriminating between conditions that 
are diagnostically or therapeutically normal and those that are diagnostically or ther-
apeutically abnormal. In other words, harm is taken to be a necessary requirement 
for a definition of diagnostic or therapeutic abnormality [7, p. 13].
Let us continue by unpacking the harm requirement and clarifying with respect 
to whom, by whom, and how distress and disability  should be judged and evalu-
ated (again, the proceeding list is merely descriptive). We aim to show that the harm 
requirement can in reality be interpreted in many different and contrasting ways, 
making its current general wording—‘the disturbance causes clinically significant 
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of function-
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First, it is pivotal to clarify with respect to whom distress and disability—if pre-
sent—should actually be judged and evaluated. At first blush, the most reasonable 
choice seems to be to assess the amount of harm, if any, that is directly experienced 
by the disordered subject. This is clear when considering mental conditions such as 
autism spectrum disorder [2, p. 50], schizophrenia [2, p. 99], bipolar disorders [2, p. 
123], major depression disorder [2, p. 160], anxiety disorders [2, p. 189], or sexual 
dysfunctions [2, p. 423]; in all of these cases, if distress or disability is actually pre-
sent, it directly harms the disordered subject. Other cases, however, are less obvious.
Consider mental disorders such as pyromania [2, p. 476], kleptomania [2, p. 478], 
or antisocial personality disorder [2, p. 659]. In these cases, the harm potentially 
experienced by the subject (e.g., being imprisoned, isolated from the community, 
and so forth) seems to be not only indirect—stemming not from the underlying dys-
function itself, but from the society the subject lives in—but also irrelevant to the 
diagnosis. In fact, the harm to assess seems to be that experienced by people other 
than the disordered subject (her family, her community, etc.). For instance, focusing 
on antisocial personality disorder, criterion A, ‘a pervasive pattern of disregard for 
and violation of the rights of others’ [2, p. 659], seems to be recognized as a symp-
tom of a dysfunction, and thus of a pathological condition, when it causes harm to 
other people, not to the disordered subject. A similar point can be made regarding 
certain paraphilic disorders, where harm can be assessed either in relation to the 
disordered subject or in relation to people other than the disordered subject. With 
regard to sexual sadism disorder [2, p. 695], for instance, criterion B states that 
‘the individual has acted on these sexual urges with a nonconsenting person, or the 
sexual urges or fantasies cause clinically significant distress or impairment’ [2, p. 
695] (emphasis  added); the use of disjunctive ‘or’ in criterion B leaves open the 
possibility of recognizing the syndrome as a mental disorder even when it causes 
harm only to people other than the disordered subject—that is, when ‘the individual 
has acted on these sexual urges with a nonconsenting person’, thus causing harm to 
that person, but does not subjectively experience any clinically significant distress 
or disability. Again, the subject can be indirectly harmed by the society she lives in 
(e.g., being imprisoned, isolated from the community, and so forth), but this kind of 
harm potentially experienced by the subject seems irrelevant for judging whether the 
syndrome is a mental disorder.
Second, it should be determined who is best suited to decide what exactly counts 
as distress and disability, as well as their respective threshold values. Sometimes it is 
reasonable to suppose that the disordered subject who is experiencing harm is most 
entitled to judge and evaluate this harm. Consider conditions such as major depres-
sive disorder [2, p. 160], specific phobias [2, p. 197], social anxiety disorder [2, p. 
202], most sexual dysfunctions [2, p. 423], or gender dysphoria [2, p. 452]. In the 
case of erectile disorder, for instance, the subject is clearly the only person entitled 
to make judgments about the amount of distress or disability he is actually experi-
encing. Some complications might arise, however, since in certain instances of the 
above mental disorders (e.g., in some cases of major depressive disorder), a medi-
cal specialist, like the psychiatrist, may be more capable of judging and evaluating 
whether or not the signs and symptoms experienced by the subject are pathologi-
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useful measurements of severity). Similarly, there seem to be some mental disorders 
for which harm can be better evaluated by a psychiatrist in the majority of cases: as 
when subjects are severely intellectually impaired (e.g., major neurocognitive disor-
ders [2, p. 202]); when subjects’ medical conditions may render them unable to rec-
ognize the harm they are experiencing (e.g., hoarding disorder or anorexia nervosa 
[2, pp. 247, 338]); or when subjects may be unable to recognize the harm they are 
causing to others (e.g., antisocial personality disorder [2, p. 476]).
Third, it is also critical to establish what kinds of standards  should be used to 
evaluate distress and disability. Here, at least two alternatives seem viable: on the 
one hand, it is possible to have certain clinically ‘objective’ standards, as may be 
used for mild and major cognitive disorders [2, p. 202]; and on the other hand, it is 
possible to have standards that are largely context-sensitive. The latter may be used 
for hoarding disorder [2, p. 247], where distress and disability are also judged and 
evaluated on the basis of contextual variables, such as the kind of environment the 
subject is living in.
To recap, it could be pragmatically useful to include the harm requirement among 
the specific diagnostic criteria of many individual mental disorders, but only as long 
as its role is made explicit and its characteristics are better specified. These final 
considerations could suggest another way to defend, from a theoretical point of view, 
the necessity of the harm requirement for the general notion of mental disorder. One 
might say that the harm requirement just needs to be appropriately refined before 
being included in the general definition of mental disorder; should such refine-
ment occur, the harm requirement could then be regarded as a necessary condition 
for mental disorder. We find this proposal quite problematic, however.
To start, we have shown that there are several mental disorders (as tokens or 
types) that can hardly be considered harmful. But let us assume for the sake of argu-
ment that there is a way to refine the harm requirement so as to encompass all of 
these, deeming them harmful in one way or another. In such case, of course, the 
harm requirement would not be as general as its present iteration (which includes 
just two relatively unspecific disjuncts), but would  instead include many different 
more precise disjuncts. We feel, however, that this latter point strengthens the argu-
ments we have  developed in the preceding sections against the harm requirement 
as a necessary criterion for mental disorder: as the refined harm requirement would 
include a wide variety of disjuncts, it would be unfit to figure within the general 
definition of mental disorder, which needs a general definiens. Thus, it would make 
more sense to speak of numerous harm requirements, in the plural, that can be used 
as specific diagnostic criteria—at least given the current state of psychiatric knowl-
edge—but do not figure in the general definition of mental disorder.
Tentative conclusions
In the present paper, we have sought to clarify what it means to say that the harm 
requirement is not necessary for the general concept of mental disorder and to 
explore arguments that may be advanced  in favour of that position. As a prelimi-
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requirement—namely, distress and disability—and traced a distinction between 
mental disorder tokens and mental disorder types. We then argued that denying the 
necessity of the harm requirement is not only in line with the DSM-5 nosology but 
also extremely  tenable for a variety of theoretical and practical reasons. Our main 
point here has been to demonstrate that the harm requirement should not be included 
within any general definition of mental disorder.
Given all this, two options are theoretically available: either the general defini-
tion of mental disorder must be dropped or, if one wishes to maintain it, the harm 
requirement must be downgraded from a necessary component to a frequent or typi-
cal  characteristic of mental disorders. Other fields of medicine, such as oncology, 
do not feel the need to integrate their nosologies with a general definition of disease 
and have thus simply  abandoned the definition and the effort; psychiatry, being a 
more recent field of medicine, still likely needs an operative general definition of 
mental disorder, and in this sense we support the decision of the DSM-5 Task Force 
to downgrade the harm requirement,  retaining the dysfunction requirement as the 
only necessary component of mental disorders.
Even if the harm requirement is not considered a necessary component of the 
general definition of mental disorder, we also believe that—given the current state 
of knowledge—it can possibly be maintained among the specific  diagnostic cri-
teria of  certain individual mental disorders. That being said, we have also argued 
that, in such case, the requirement must be unpacked in order to clarify (i) what 
its precise role is as a diagnostic criterion and (ii) with respect to whom, by whom, 
and how distress and disability should actually be judged and evaluated in practice. 
Our aim in this regard has been to show that the harm requirement can be used and 
interpreted in many different and contrasting ways, making its current general word-
ing ambiguous and problematic and—more importantly—making it unfit to figure 
within any general definition of mental disorder.
Notes
Although this paper was mutually conceived and discussed, Maria Cristina Amoretti 
should be considered responsible for the  sections entitled ‘The harm require-
ment’ and ‘The harm requirement as a diagnostic criterion’, while Elisabetta 
Lalumera  should be considered responsible for the  sections entitled ‘Introduction’ 
and ‘Against the harm requirement’.
Acknowledgements We wish to thank Luca Malatesti and two anonymous reviewers  for Theoretical 
Medicine and Bioethics for their insightful comments and constructive criticisms.
References
 1. Wakefield, Jerome C. 1992. The concept of mental disorder: On the boundary between biological 
facts and social values. American Psychologist 47: 373–388.
 2. American Psychiatric Association. 2013. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 5th 









































    








Journal : SmallExtended 11017 Article No : 9499 Pages : 17 MS Code : 9499 Dispatch : 4-9-2019
 M. C. Amoretti, E. Lalumera 
1 3
 3. Cooper, Rachel. 2015. Must disorders cause harm? The changing stance of the DSM. In The DSM-5 
in perspective: Philosophical reflections on the psychiatric babel, ed. Steeves Demazeux and Patrick 
Singy, 83–96. Dordrecht: Springer.
 4. Amoretti, Maria Cristina, and Elisabetta Lalumera. 2019. A potential tension in DSM-5: The gen-
eral definition of mental disorder versus some specific diagnostic criteria. Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 44: 85–108.
 5. Boorse, Christopher. 1976. What a theory of mental health should be. Journal for the Theory of 
Social Behaviour 6: 61–84.
 6. Boorse, Christopher. 1977. Heath as a theoretical concept. Philosophy of Science 44: 542–573.
 7. Boorse, Christopher. 1997. A rebuttal on health. In What is disease?, ed. James M. Humber and 
Robert F. Almeder, 1–134. Totowa: Humana Press.
 8. American Psychiatric Association. 1987. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 3rd 
ed, revised. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
 9. American Psychiatric Association. 1994. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 4th 
ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
 10. American Psychiatric Association. 2000. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 4th 
ed, text rev. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
 11. Amoretti, Maria Cristina, and Elisabetta Lalumera. 2018. Il criterio del “danno” nella definizione di 
disturbo mentale del DSM: Alcune riflessioni epistemologiche. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e 
Psicologia 9: 139–150.
 12. Bayer, Ronald. 1981. Homosexuality and American psychiatry: The politics of diagnosis. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
 13. Spitzer, Robert L. 1981. The diagnostic status of homosexuality in DSM-III: A reformulation of the 
issues. American Journal of Psychiatry 138: 210–215.
 14. American Psychiatric Association. 1972. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 2nd 
ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
 15. American Psychiatric Association. 1980. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 3rd 
ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
 16. Wakefield, Jerome C. 2014. The biostatistical theory versus the harmful dysfunction analysis, part 
1: Is part-dysfunction a sufficient condition for medical disorder? Journal of Medicine and Philoso-
phy 39: 648–682.
 17. Cabaj, Robert P., and Terry S. Stein (eds.). 1996. Textbook of homosexuality and mental health. 
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
 18. Wakefield, Jerome C. 2017. Can the harmful dysfunction analysis explain why addiction is a medi-
cal disorder? Reply to Marc Lewis. Neuroethics 10: 313–317.
 19. Phillips, Michael R. 2009. Is distress a symptom of mental disorders, a marker of impairment, both 
or neither? World Psychiatry 8: 91–92.
 20. Mathers, Colin D., and Dejan Loncar. 2006. Projections of global mortality and burden of disease 
from 2002 to 2030. PLOS Medicine 3: e442. https ://doi.org/10.1371/journ al.pmed.00304 42.
 21. World Health Organization. 1980. International classification of impairment, disability and handi-
cap. Geneva: World Health Organization.
 22. World Health Organization. 2018. International statistical classification of diseases and related 
health problems, 11th revision. https ://icd.who.int/en. Accessed April 25, 2019.
 23. World Health Organization. 2017. International classification of functioning, disability and health. 
Geneva: World Health Organization.
 24. Boorse, Cristopher. 2010. Disability and medical theory. In Philosophical reflections on disability, 
ed. D. Christopher Ralston and Justin Ho, 55–88. Dordrecht: Springer.
 25. Gold, Liza H. 2014. DSM-5 and the assessment of functioning: The World Health Organization Dis-
ability Assessment Schedule 2.0 (WHODAS 2.0). Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry 
and the Law 42: 173–181.
 26. Oliver, Michael. 1996. Understanding disability: From theory to practice. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press.
 27. Wakefield, Jerome C. 2009. Disability and diagnosis: Should role impairment be eliminated from 
DSM/ICD diagnostic criteria? World Psychiatry 8: 87–88.
 28. Murphy, Dominic. 2011. Conceptual foundations of biological psychiatry. In Philosophy of medi-
cine, ed. Fred Gifford, 425–451. Amsterdam: Elsevier.




























































    








Journal : SmallExtended 11017 Article No : 9499 Pages : 17 MS Code : 9499 Dispatch : 4-9-2019
1 3
Harm should not be a necessary criterion for mental disorder:…
 30. Cooper, Rachel. 2002. Disease. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biomedical Sciences 33: 
263–282.
 31. Romme, Marius, Sandra Escher, Jacqui Dillon, Dirk Corstens, and Mervyn Morris. 2009. Living 
with voices: 50 stories of recovery. Monmouth: PCCS Books.
 32. Wakefield, Jerome C. 1999. Evolutionary versus prototype analyses of the concept of disorder. Jour-
nal of Abnormal Psychology 108: 374–399.
 33. Clouser, K. Danner, Charles M. Culver, and Bernard Gert. 1981. Malady: A new treatment of dis-
ease. Hastings Center Report 11(3): 29–37.
 34. Kendler, Kenneth S., John Myers, and Sidney Zisook. 2008. Does bereavement-related major 
depression differ from major depression associated with other stressful life events? American Jour-
nal of Psychiatry 165: 1449–1455.
 35. Wakefield, Jerome C. 2012. Should prolonged grief be reclassified as a mental disorder in DSM-5? 
Reconsidering the empirical and conceptual arguments for complicated grief disorder. Journal of 
Nervous and Mental Diseases 200: 499–511.
 36. Spitzer, Robert L., and Jerome C. Wakefield. 1999. DSM-IV diagnostic criterion for clinical sig-
nificance: Does it help solve the false positives problem? American Journal of Psychiatry 156: 
1856–1864.
 37. Miller, Joshua D., W. Keith Campbell, and Paul A. Pilkonis. 2007. Narcissistic personality disorder: 
Relations with distress and functional impairment. Comprehensive Psychiatry 48: 170–177.
 38. Ong, Clarissa, Shirlene Pang, Vathsala Sagayadevan, Siow Ann Chong, and Mythily Subramaniam. 
2015. Functioning and quality of life in hoarding: A systematic review. Journal of Anxiety Disorders 
32: 17–30.
 39. Narrow, William E., and Emily A. Kuhl. 2011. Clinical significance and disorder thresholds in 
DSM-5: The role of disability and distress. In The conceptual evolution of DSM-5, ed. Darrel A. 
Regier, William E. Narrow, Emily A. Kuhl, and David J. Kupfer, 147–162. Washington, DC: Ameri-
can Psychiatric Publishing.
 40. Lehman, Anthony F. 2009. Disentangle diagnosis and disability. World Psychiatry 8: 89–90.
 41. Curtis, Ted, Robert Dellar, Esther Leslie, and Ben Watson (eds.). 2000. Mad pride: A celebration of 
mad culture. Truro: Chipmunka.
 42. Mann, Thomas. 1924. Der Zauberberg. Berlin: Fischer.
 43. Ustün, Bedirhan, and Cille Kennedy. 2009. What is “functional impairment”? Disentangling disabil-
ity from clinical significance. World Psychiatry 8: 82–85.
 44. Sartorius, Norman. 2009. Disability and mental illness are different entities and should be assessed 
separately. World Psychiatry 8: 86.
 45. Schalock, Robert L., Sharon A. Borthwick-Duffy, Valerie J. Bradley, Wil H.E. Buntinx, David L. 
Coulter, Ellis M. Craig, Sharon C. Gomez, et al. 2010. Intellectual disability: Definition, classifica-
tion, and systems of supports, 11th ed. Washington, DC: American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities.
 46. Kendler, Kenneth. 2017. Introduction to ‘Clinical significance, disability, and biomarkers: Shifts in 
thinking between DSM-4 and DSM-5’. In Philosophical issues in psychiatry IV: Psychiatric nosol-
ogy, ed. Kenneth S. Kendler and Josef Parnas, 5–7. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 47. Boorse, Christopher. 2014. A second rebuttal on health. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39: 
683–724.
 48. Insel, Thomas R. 2014. The NIMH Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project: Precision medicine 
for psychiatry. American Journal of Psychiatry 171: 395–397.
 49. Glasziou, Paul, Ray Moynihan, Tessa Richards, and Fiona Godlee. 2013. Too much medicine; too 
little care. British Medical Journal 347: f4247. https ://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.f4247 .
 50. World Health Organization. 2000. World Health Organization Disability Assessment Schedule 
(WHODAS 2.0). Geneva: World Health Organization.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
